Providing Receipt-Freeness in Mixnet-Based Voting Protocols

Abstract. It had been thought that it is difficult to provide receiptfreeness in mixnet-based electronic voting schemes. Any kind of user chosen randomness can be used to construct a receipt, since a user can prove to a buyer how he had encrypted the ballot. In this paper we propose a simple and efficient method to incorporate receipt-freeness in mixnetbased electronic voting schemes by using the well known re-encryption technique and designated verifier re-encryption proof (DVRP). In our scheme a voter has to prepare his encrypted ballot through a randomization service provided by a tamper resistant randomizer (TRR), in such a way that he finally loses his knowledge on randomness. This method can be used in most mixnet-based electronic voting scheme to provide receipt-freeness. Keywords. Electronic voting, Receipt-freeness, Mixnet, Re-encryption, Designated-verifier re-encryption proof, Tamper resistant randomizer.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: ICISC
• Authors: Byoungcheon Lee, Colin Boyd, Ed Dawson, Kwangjo Kim, Jeongmo Yang, Seungjae Yoo
• Keywords: Electronic Voting Scheme, ICISC 2003, ICISC 2007, Mixnet-based Electronic Voting, Tamper Resistant Randomizer