Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage

Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture side-channel attacks. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. Inspired by recent side-channel attacks, especially the “cold boot attacks”, Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan (TCC ’09) formalized a realistic framework for modeling the security of encryption schemes against a wide class of side-channel attacks in which adversarially chosen functions of the secret key are leaked. In the setting of public-key encryption, Akavia et al. showed that Regev’s lattice-based scheme (STOC ’05) is resilient to any leakage of L/polylog(L) bits, where L is the length of the secret key. In this paper we revisit the above-mentioned framework and our main results are as follows: • We present a generic construction of a public-key encryption scheme that is resilient to key leakag...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: CRYPTO
• Authors: Moni Naor, Gil Segev
• Keywords: CRYPTO 2009, Cryptology, Encryption Scheme, Proof Systems, Side-channel Attacks