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SIAMCOMP
2011

A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives

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A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with a nonnegligible probability for any election rule among three alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship and from having only two alternatives in its range.
Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisa
Added 17 Sep 2011
Updated 17 Sep 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Where SIAMCOMP
Authors Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisan
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