Ranking judgments in Arrow's setting

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004). Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments proved in List and Pettit (Economics and Philosophy 18:89–110, 2002) and Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, Social choice and individual values, 1963). I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004) to the conditions on the aggregation procedure. Keywords Arrow’s theorem · Conodorcet’s paradox · Discursive dilemma · Aggregation of ranking judgments · First order logic

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: SYNTHESE
• Authors: Daniele Porello
• Keywords: First Order Logic, Judgments, Ranking Judgments, SYNTHESE 2010