Rapid Mixing and Security of Chaum's Visual Electronic Voting

Recently, David Chaum proposed an electronic voting scheme that combines visual cryptography and digital processing. It was designed to meet not only mathematical security standards, but also to be accepted by voters that do not trust electronic devices. In this scheme mix-servers are used to guarantee anonymity of the votes in the counting process. The mix-servers are operated by different parties, so an evidence of their correct operation is necessary. For this purpose the protocol uses randomized partial checking of Jakobsson et al., where some randomly selected connections between the (encoded) inputs and outputs of a mix-server are revealed. This leaks some information about the ballots, even if intuitively this information cannot be used for any efficient attack. We provide a rigorous stochastic analysis of how much information is revealed by randomized partial checking in the Chaum’s protocol. We estimate how many mix-servers are necessary for a fair security level. Namely, w...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: ESORICS
• Authors: Marcin Gomulkiewicz, Marek Klonowski, Miroslaw Kutylowski
• Keywords: Chaum’s Protocol, David Chaum, ESORICS 2003, Randomized Partial Checking, Security Privacy