Rational play and rational beliefs under uncertainty

Alternating-time temporal logic (atl) is one of the most influential logics for reasoning about agents’ abilities. Constructive Strategic Logic (csl) is a variant of atl for imperfect information games that allows to express strategic and epistemic properties of coalitions under uncertainty. In this paper, we propose a logic that extends csl with a notion of plausibility that can be used for reasoning about the outcome of rational behavior (in the game-theoretical sense). Moreover, we show how a particular notion of beliefs can be defined on top of plausibility. The resulting logic, cslp, turns out to be very expressive. We show that beliefs satisfy axioms KD45 in the logic. We also demonstrate how solution concepts for imperfect information games can be characterized and used in cslp and that the model checking complexity increases only slightly when plausibility and rational beliefs are added. Categories and Subject Descriptors I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Arti...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Nils Bulling, Wojciech Jamroga
• Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, ATAL 2009, Imperfect Information Games, Logic, Temporal Logic