Related-Key Attack on Full-Round PICARO

Side-channel cryptanalysis is a very efficient class of attacks that recovers secret information by exploiting the physical leakage of a device executing a cryptographic computation. To adress this type of attack, many countermeasures have been proposed, and some papers adressed the question of constructing an efficient masking scheme for existing ciphers. In their work, G. Piret, T. Roche and C. Carlet took the problem the other way around and specifically designed a cipher that would be easy to mask. Their careful analysis, that started with the design of an adapted Sbox, leads to the construction of a 12-round Feistel cipher named PICARO. In this paper, we present the first fullround cryptanalysis of this cipher and show how to recover the key in the related-key model. Our analysis takes advantage of the low diffusion of the key schedule together with the non-bijectivity of PICARO Sbox. Our best trade-off has a time complexity equivalent to 2107.4 encryptions, a data complexity ...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: SACRYPT
• Authors: Anne Canteaut, Virginie Lallemand, María Naya-Plasencia
• Keywords: Cryptology, SACRYPT 2015