Relational Modality

Saul Kripke's thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If we, like Kripke, account for this difference by means of the intensions of names and descriptions, we have to conclude that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, the difference in scope behavior between names and description can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed `relational modality', simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal con...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: JOLLI
• Authors: Kathrin Glüer, Peter Pagin
• Keywords: JOLLI 2008, Modal Expressions, Proper Names, Relational Modality