Peer-to-peer are popular environments for exchanging services. A reputation mechanism is a proper means of discovering low-performing peers that fail to provide their services. In this paper, we present an in-depth and innovative study of how reputation can be exploited so that the right incentives for high performance are provided to peers. Such incentives do not arise if peers exploit reputation only when selecting the best providing peer; this approach may lead high-performing peers to receive unfairly low value from the system. We argue and justify experimentally that the calculation of reputation values has to be complemented by proper reputation-based policies that determine the pairs of peers eligible to interact with each other. We introduce two different dimensions of reputation-based policies, namely ``provider selection'' and ``contention resolution'', as well as specific policies for each dimension. We perform extensive comparative assessment of a wide ...
Thanasis G. Papaioannou, George D. Stamoulis