Revenue maximization with a single sample

We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuations of indistinguishable bidders are independent draws from a common distribution. Crucially, we assume all valuation distributions are a priori unknown to the seller. Despite this handicap, we show how to obtain approximately optimal expected revenue — nearly as large as what could be obtained if the distributions were known in advance — under quite general conditions. Our most general result concerns arbitrary downwardclosed single-parameter environments and valuation distributions that satisfy a standard hazard rate condition. We also assume that no bidder has a unique attribute value, which is obviously necessary with unknown and attributedependent valuation distributions. Here, we give an auction that, for every such environment and unknown valuation distributions, has expected revenue at least a const...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan
• Keywords: Bidder’s Valuation, ECommerce, ONR Young Investigator, SIGECOM 2010, Valuation Distributions