A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

This paper presents a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first protocol that has an open format, and in which sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy, even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit falsename bids. As ever-increasing numbers of companies and consumers are trading on Internet auctions, a new type of cheating called “false-name bids” has been noticed. Specifically, there may be some agents with fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses. The VCG is not an open format, and truth-telling is no longer a dominant strategy if agents can submit false-name bids and the marginal utilities of each agent can increase. The Iterative Reducing (IR) protocol with a sealed-bid format is robust against falsename bids, although it requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine a reservation price for one unit. Open format protocols, such as the Ausubel auction, outperform seal...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada
• Keywords: False-name Bids, Marginal Utilities, Open Format, SIGECOM 2003