Secure acknowledgment aggregation and multisignatures with limited robustness

In certain reliable group-oriented and multicast applications, a source needs to securely verify whether all (and if not all, which) intended receivers have received a message. However, secure verification of individual acknowledgments from all receivers can impose a significant computation and communication burden. Such cost can be significantly reduced if intermediate nodes along the distribution tree aggregate the acknowledgments produced by the multicast receivers into a single multisignature. The approach explored in prior work on acknowledgment aggregation [11] is based on a multisignature scheme of [1]. However, this multisignature scheme requires a relatively new cryptographic assumption of "Gap Diffie-Hellman". In contrast, we propose a solution using multisignature schemes secure under more standard and long-standing security assumptions. In particular, we show how to extend previously known non-robust multisignature scheme [9] based on the discrete logarithm assump...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2006
• Where: CN
• Authors: Claude Castelluccia, Stanislaw Jarecki, Jihye Kim, Gene Tsudik
• Keywords: CN 2006, Multicast Applications, Multicast Receivers, Multisignature Schemes