Securing Threshold Cryptosystems against Chosen Ciphertext Attack

For the most compelling applications of threshold cryptosystems, security against chosen ciphertext attack is a requirement. However, prior to the results presented here, there appeared to be no practical threshold cryptosystems in the literature that were provably chosen-ciphertext secure, even in the idealized random oracle model. The contribution of this paper is to present two very practical threshold cryptosystems, and to prove that they are secure against chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model. Not only are these protocols computationally very efficient, but they are also non-interactive, which means they can be easily run over an asynchronous communication network.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 1998
• Where: EUROCRYPT
• Authors: Victor Shoup, Rosario Gennaro
• Keywords: Chosen Ciphertext Attack, Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 1998, Practical Threshold Cryptosystems, Threshold Cryptosystems