Security Limits for Compromising Emanations

Nearly half a century ago, military organizations introduced “Tempest” emission-security test standards to control information leakage from unintentional electromagnetic emanations of digital electronics. The nature of these emissions has changed with evolving technology; electromechanic devices have vanished and signal frequencies increased several orders of magnitude. Recently published eavesdropping attacks on modern flat-panel displays and cryptographic coprocessors demonstrate that the risk remains acute for applications with high protection requirements. The ultra-wideband signal processing technology needed for practical attacks finds already its way into consumer electronics. Current civilian RFI limits are entirely unsuited for emission security purposes. Only an openly available set of test standards based on published criteria will help civilian vendors and users to estimate and manage emission-security risks appropriately. This paper outlines a proposal and rationale ...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: CHES
• Authors: Markus G. Kuhn
• Keywords: CHES 2005, Civilian Rfi Limits, Cryptography, Test Standards, Unintentional Electromagnetic Emanations