Semidefinite programming for N-Player Games

Abstract. We introduce two min-max problems: the first problem is to minimize the supremum of finitely many rational functions over a compact basic semi-algebraic set whereas the second problem is a 2-player zero-sum polynomial game in randomized strategies and with compact basic semi-algebraic pure strategy sets. It is proved that their optimal solution can be approximated by solving a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations, in the spirit of the moment approach developed in Lasserre [19, 20]. This provides a unified approach and a class of algorithms to approximate all Nash equilibria and min-max strategies of many static and dynamic games. Each semidefinite relaxation can be solved in time which is polynomial in its input size and practice from global optimization suggests that very often few relaxations are needed for a good approximation (and sometimes even finite convergence). In many cases (e.g. for Nash equilibria) the error of a relaxation can be computed.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Rida Laraki, Jean B. Lasserre
• Keywords: 2-player Zero-sum Polynomial, CORR 2008, Education, Nash Equilibria, Semidefinite Relaxation