Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust

In this paper we propose a new voting protocol with desirable security properties. The voting stage of the protocol can be performed by humans without computers; it provides every voter with the means to verify that all the votes were counted correctly (universal verifiability) while preserving ballot secrecy. The protocol has “everlasting privacy”: even a computationally unbounded adversary gains no information about specific votes from observing the protocol’s output. Unlike previous protocols with these properties, this protocol distributes trust between two authorities: a single corrupt authority will not cause voter privacy to be breached. Finally, the protocol is receipt-free: a voter cannot prove how she voted even she wants to do so. We formally prove the security of the protocol in the Universal Composability framework, based on number-theoretic assumptions. Categories and Subject Descriptors C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems—Distributed A...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: CCS
• Authors: Tal Moran, Moni Naor
• Keywords: CCS 2007, Desirable Security Properties, Protocol Distributes Trust, Security Privacy, Voter