Stable marriage problems with quantitative preferences

The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members of the other sex, in a qualitative way. Here we consider stable marriage problems with quantitative preferences: each man (resp., woman) provides a score for each woman (resp., man). Such problems are more expressive than the classical stable marriage problems. Moreover, in some real-life situations it is more natural to express scores (to model, for example, profits or costs) rather than a qualitative preference ordering. In this context, we define new notions of stability and optimality, and we provide algorithms to find marriag...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
• Keywords: Classical Stable Marriage, CORR 2010, Education, Quantitative Preferences, Stable Marriage Problem