Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games

Abstract. We present computational results concerning stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. First, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a contractually individually stable partition. This contrasts with previous results such as NP-hardness of computing individually stable or Nash stable partitions. Secondly, we prove that checking whether the core or the strict core exists is NP-hard in the strong sense even if the preferences of the players are symmetric. Finally, it is shown that verifying whether a partition consisting of the grand coalition is contractually strict core stable or Pareto optimal is coNP-complete.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig
• Keywords: CORR 2010, Education, Nash Stable Partitions, Stable Partitions, Strict Core