STILL: Exploit Code Detection via Static Taint and Initialization Analyses

We propose STILL, a generic defense based on Static Taint and InitiaLization anaLyses, to detect exploit code embedded in data streams/requests targeting at various Internet services such as Web services. STILL first blindly disassembles each request, generates a (probably partial) control flow graph, and then uses novel static taint and initialization analysis algorithms to determine if strong evidence of self-modifying (including polymorphism) and/or indirect jump code obfuscation behavior can be collected. If such evidence exists, STILL will raise an alarm and block the request; otherwise, STILL will perform another form of static taint analysis to check whether unobfuscated or other types of obfuscated exploit code (e.g., metamorphism, etc) is embedded in the request. To the best of our knowledge, compared with existing static analysis approaches developed for the same purpose, STILL is (a) the first one that can detect self-modifying code and indirect jump, and (b) a more comp...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: ACSAC
• Authors: Xinran Wang, Yoon-chan Jhi, Sencun Zhu, Peng Liu
• Keywords: ACSAC 2008, Code Obfuscation, Exploit Code, Security Privacy, Static Taint