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MOR
2010

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks

13 years 10 months ago
Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents to the location of the facility. We wish to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents can never benefit by lying, and at the same time provide a small approximation ratio with respect to the minimax measure. We design a novel “hybrid” strategyproof randomized mechanism that provides a tight approximation ratio of 3/2 when the network is a circle (known as a ring in the case of computer networks). Furthermore, we show that no randomized SP mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2 − o(1) even when the network is a tree, thereby matching a trivial upper bound of two.
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Mos
Added 29 Jan 2011
Updated 29 Jan 2011
Type Journal
Year 2010
Where MOR
Authors Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
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