Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange from Factoring, Codes, and Lattices

Abstract. An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and maximal exposure attacks without relying on random oracles. HMQV, a state of the art AKE protocol, achieves both efficiency and the strong security model proposed by Krawczyk (we call it the CK+ model), which includes resistance to advanced attacks. However, the security proof is given under the random oracle model. We propose a generic construction of AKE from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure KEM, and the resultant AKE protocol is CK+ secure in the standard model. The protocol gives the first CK+ secure AKE protocols based on the hardness of integer factorization problem, code-based problems, or learning problems with errors. In addition, instantiations under the Diffie-Hellman assumption or its variant can be proved to have strong security without...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2012
• Where: PKC
• Authors: Atsushi Fujioka, Koutarou Suzuki, Keita Xagawa, Kazuki Yoneyama
• Keywords: Cryptology, PKC 2012, Random Oracle Model, Random Oracles, Security Proof