Threat Analysis of a Practical Voting Scheme with Receipts

Kutylowski et al. have introduced a voter-verifiable electronic voting scheme ”a practical voting scheme with receipts”, which provides each voter with a receipt. The voter can use her receipt to check whether her vote has been properly counted in the final tally, but she cannot use the receipt to prove others how she has voted. Another interesting property of this scheme is that, thanks to the repetitive robustness mix network, the ballot tallying phase only needs to be audited if the final results fail to achieve some conditions. However, this paper will show that this scheme is vulnerable to some threats, adversaries can not only violate voter privacy, but also forge the election result.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: VOTEID
• Authors: Sébastien Foulle, Steve Schneider, Jacques Traoré, Zhe Xia
• Keywords: Electronic Voting Scheme, Internet Technology, Practical Voting Scheme, VOTEID 2007, Voting Scheme