Timed Spi-Calculus with Types for Secrecy and Authenticity

Abstract. We present a discretely timed spi-calculus. A primitive for key compromise allows us to model key compromise attacks, thus going beyond the standard Dolev–Yao attacker model. A primitive for reading a global clock allows us to express protocols based on timestamps, which are common in practice. We accompany the timed spi-calculus with a type system, prove that well-typed protocols are robustly safe for secrecy and authenticity and present examples of well-typed protocols as well as an example where failure to typecheck reveals a (well-known) flaw.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: CONCUR
• Authors: Christian Haack, Alan Jeffrey
• Keywords: CONCUR 2005, Key Compromise, Key Compromise Attacks, Timed Spi-calculus