Truthful assignment without money

We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job’s private information. That is, the selfish agents in our model are the jobs, and their private information is their edge set. We want to design mechanisms that are truthful without money (henceforth strategyproof ), and produce assignments whose welfare is a good approximation to the optimal omniscient welfare. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal stra...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Shaddin Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh
• Keywords: Approximate Mechanisms, Bipartite Graph, ECommerce, SIGECOM 2010, Strategyproof Mechanism