Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions

We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical benefits, is inappropriate if “antisocial” agents participate in the auction process. More specifically, an antisocial attitude for economic agents that makes reducing the profit of competitors their main goal besides maximizing their own profit is introduced. Under this novel condition, agents need to deviate from the dominant truth-telling strategy. This paper presents a strategy for bidders in repeated Vickrey auctions who are intending to inflict losses to fellow agents in order to be more successful, not in absolute measures, but relatively to the group of bidders.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2001
• Where: AGENTS
• Authors: Felix Brandt, Gerhard Weiß
• Keywords: AGENTS 2001, Antisocial Attitude, Dominant Truth-telling Strategy, Security Privacy, Vickrey Auctions