Window-games between TCP flows

We consider network congestion problems between TCP flows and define a new game, the Window-game, which models the problems of network congestion caused by the competing flows. Analytical and experimental results show the relevance of the Window-game to real TCP congestion games and provide interesting insight into the respective Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we propose a new algorithmic queue mechanism, called Prince, which at congestion makes a scapegoat of the most greedy flow. We provide evidence which shows that Prince achieves efficient Nash equilibria while requiring only limited computational resources. Key words: Algorithmic Game Theory, Network Games, Nash Equilibrium

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: TCS
• Authors: Pavlos S. Efraimidis, Lazaros Tsavlidis, George B. Mertzios
• Keywords: Nash Equilibria, Network Congestion, Network Congestion Problems, TCS 2010, Theoretical Computer Science