Abstract. Using a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus designed for specifying security properties as observational equivalences, we develop a form of bisimulation that j...
Ajith Ramanathan, John C. Mitchell, Andre Scedrov,...
Cryptographic protocols are small programs which involve a high level of concurrency and which are difficult to analyze by hand. The most successful methods to verify such protocol...
We describe CoSP, a general framework for conducting computational soundness proofs of symbolic models and for embedding these proofs into formal calculi. CoSP considers arbitrary...
Adopting a programming-language perspective, we study the problem of implementing authentication in a distributed system. We define a process calculus with constructs for authent...
The work of Abadi and Fournet introduces the notion of a frame to describe the knowledge of the environment of a cryptographic protocol. Frames are lists of terms; two frames are ...