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ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
Toby Walsh
ICDCSW
2006
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Interdomain Routing as Social Choice
Interdomain routing is essential to both the stability and efficiency of the global Internet. However, most previous studies focus only on stability, and only on a special class ...
Ronny Ramzi Dakdouk, Semih Salihoglu, Hao Wang, Ha...
MFCS
2009
Springer
14 years 1 days ago
Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
Abstract. To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggre...
Nadja Betzler, Britta Dorn
CLIMA
2010
13 years 7 months ago
Is Computational Complexity a Barrier to Manipulation?
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballo...
Toby Walsh
AAAI
2006
13 years 9 months ago
Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates
Voting (or rank aggregation) is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One important voting rule is the Slater rule. It selects a ranking of the alte...
Vincent Conitzer