We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure under real, active cryptographic attacks including concurrent protocol runs. This proof is based on an abstract crypt...
We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in ...
Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David A. Basin...
Specification documents for real-world authentication protocols typically mandate some aspects of a protocol's behavior but leave other features optional or undefined. In add...
Abstract We present a computational analysis of basic Kerberos with and without its public-key extension PKINIT in which we consider authentication and key secrecy properties. Our ...
Michael Backes, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard...
Abstract. We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomialtime equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum pr...