We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
We characterize the price of anarchy in weighted congestion games, as a function of the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of this ...
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Martin Gairing, Tim Roughgarden
This paper presents a theory of runtime enforcement based on mechanism models called MRAs (Mandatory Results Automata). MRAs can monitor and transform security-relevant actions and...
We propose a network characterization of combinatorial fitness landscapes by adapting the notion of inherent networks proposed for energy surfaces [5]. We use the well-known fami...
In e-learning initiatives content creators are usually required to arrange a set of learning resources in order to present them in a comprehensive way to the learner. Course mater...