We investigate equilibrium strategies for bidding agents that participate in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. For this setting, previous rese...
Enrico H. Gerding, Zinovi Rabinovich, Andrew Byde,...
Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, Davi...
In this paper, we describe a novel bidding strategy that autonomous trading agents can use to participate in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy is based on both short...
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Dave Cliff, Nicholas R. J...
We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and study a natural bidding heuristic in which advertisers attempt to o...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...