Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
Combinatorial auctions have recently attracted the interest of many researchers due to their promising applications such as the spectrum auctions recently held by the FCC. In a com...
This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions--the Vickr...
Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf ...
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, a...
Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf ...