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» A qualitative vickrey auction
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RIDE
2002
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
An Architecture for Assembling Agents that Participate in Alternative Heterogeneous Auctions
This paper addresses the issue of developing agents capable of participating in several potentially simultaneous auctions of different kinds (English, First-Price, Vickrey), with ...
Marlon Dumas, Guido Governatori, Arthur H. M. ter ...
ECWEB
2003
Springer
151views ECommerce» more  ECWEB 2003»
14 years 3 months ago
A Combinatorial Exchange for Autonomous Traders
Abstract. Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing com...
Andreas Tanner, Gero Mühl
AAAI
2000
13 years 11 months ago
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commer...
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
83views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 4 months ago
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade
IAT
2008
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Mak...