This paper addresses the issue of developing agents capable of participating in several potentially simultaneous auctions of different kinds (English, First-Price, Vickrey), with ...
Marlon Dumas, Guido Governatori, Arthur H. M. ter ...
Abstract. Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing com...
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commer...
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...