Games may be represented in many different ways, and different representations of games affect the complexity of problems associated with games, such as finding a Nash equilib...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents ...
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Pa...
Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource al...
William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wur...