We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he/she buys) and an init...
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawaren...
Most work in game theory is conducted under the assumption that the players are expected utility maximizers. Expected utility is a very tractable decision model, but is prone to w...
We present a selective survey of the main results obtained in spatial economic theory. Our focus is on "rm location. We start with the simplest location problem and proceed t...
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players that are relevant for a wide range of social, economic, and engineering applications. The standard solution conce...
Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintrau...