We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...
Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. ...
We prove NP-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium for some problems of scheduling games and connection games. The technique is standard: first, we construct a gadget without the desir...
In a congestion game, several players simultaneously aim at allocating sets of resources, e.g., each player aims at allocating a shortest path between a source/destination pair in ...
The price of anarchy (POA) is a worst-case measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a g...
We study Congestion Games with non-increasing cost functions (Cost Sharing Games) from a complexity perspective and resolve their computational hardness, which has been an open que...