This site uses cookies to deliver our services and to ensure you get the best experience. By continuing to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies and acknowledge that you have read and understand our Privacy Policy, Cookie Policy, and Terms
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
For the problem of online real-time scheduling of jobs on a single processor, previous work presents matching upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio that can be achieved ...