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» An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
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ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
WINE
2005
Springer
182views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 5 days ago
Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions
We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of t...
Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markaki...
AAAI
2004
13 years 8 months ago
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions
Recent algorithms provide powerful solutions to the problem of determining cost-minimizing (or revenue-maximizing) allocations of items in combinatorial auctions. However, in many...
Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields
AAAI
2004
13 years 8 months ago
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner determination is NP-complete unless there is special structure. We s...
Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sand...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
155views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...