Sciweavers

44 search results - page 7 / 9
» An Efficient Approximate Algorithm for Winner Determination ...
Sort
View
IJCAI
2001
13 years 8 months ago
Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
Craig Boutilier, Holger H. Hoos
WWW
2008
ACM
14 years 8 months ago
Externalities in online advertising
Most models for online advertising assume that an advertiser's value from winning an ad auction, which depends on the clickthrough rate or conversion rate of the advertisemen...
Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian
IJCAI
2001
13 years 8 months ago
Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids
This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of El...
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 18 days ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
IJCAI
2001
13 years 8 months ago
The Exponentiated Subgradient Algorithm for Heuristic Boolean Programming
Boolean linear programs (BLPs) are ubiquitous in AI. Satisfiability testing, planning with resource constraints, and winner determination in combinatorial auctions are all example...
Dale Schuurmans, Finnegan Southey, Robert C. Holte