The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from internet advertising to platforms such as eBay. In most of these applications the auctions in use are single/multi-ite...
The cooperation of end users can be exploited to boost the performance of high-bandwidth multicast. While intraoverlay cooperation, the mechanism for cooperation within a single o...
To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an is...