A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
We analyze the structure of equilibria and the price of anarchy in the family of network creation games considered extensively in the past few years, which attempt to unify the net...
Erik D. Demaine, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid M...
We introduce a novel game that models the creation of Internet-like networks by selfish node-agents without central design or coordination. Nodes pay for the links that they esta...
Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza N. Maneva, Ch...
We study a natural network creation game, in which each node locally tries to minimize its local diameter or its local average distance to other nodes, by swapping one incident ed...
Noga Alon, Erik D. Demaine, MohammadTaghi Hajiagha...