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AAAI
2010
13 years 9 months ago
Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules
In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs t...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
AAAI
2010
13 years 9 months ago
Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication
In cooperative multiagent systems an alternative that maximizes the social welfare--the sum of utilities--can only be selected if each agent reports its full utility function. Thi...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia
AAAI
2004
13 years 9 months ago
A Computational Study of the Kemeny Rule for Preference Aggregation
We consider from a computational perspective the problem of how to aggregate the ranking preferences of a number of alternatives by a number of different voters into a single cons...
Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam
CORR
2010
Springer
116views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 7 months ago
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is...
Toby Walsh