116 search results - page 5 / 24 » Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules |
SAGT
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
AAAI
2012
11 years 10 months ago
2012
Distance rationalizability is an intuitive paradigm for developing and studying voting rules: given a notion of consensus and a distance function on preference profiles, a ration...
MDAI
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
We take institutions seriously as both a rational response to dilemmas in which agents found themselves and a frame to which later rational agents adapted their behaviour in turn....
ALDT
2011
Springer
12 years 7 months ago
2011
Springer
A variety of preference aggregation schemes and voting rules have been developed in social choice to support group decision making. However, the requirement that participants provi...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 7 months ago
2008
ACM
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...