28 search results - page 2 / 6 » Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions |
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 3 months ago
2009
ACM
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
HOLOMAS
2007
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2007
Springer
To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an is...
AAAI
2000
13 years 10 months ago
2000
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
AIR
2004
13 years 8 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
RIDE
2002
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2002
IEEE
This paper addresses the issue of developing agents capable of participating in several potentially simultaneous auctions of different kinds (English, First-Price, Vickrey), with ...