28 search results - page 3 / 6 » Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions |
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2008
Springer
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
2003
IEEE
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
AAAI
2000
13 years 11 months ago
2000
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commer...
AAAI
2004
13 years 11 months ago
2004
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...