Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users’ search queries via an auction. Advertisers have to solve a complex optimization problem of how to place bids o...
We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the second-price auction mechanism whereby user bids for the chan...