We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
Many important combinatorial optimization problems can be expressed as constraint satisfaction problems with soft constraints. When problems are too difficult to be solved exactly,...
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to e...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian ...
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
In this paper, we review parallel search techniques for approximating the global optimal solution of combinatorial optimization problems. Recent developments on parallel implementa...
Panos M. Pardalos, Leonidas S. Pitsoulis, Thelma D...