22 search results - page 1 / 5 » Asymmetric Spite in Auctions |
AAAI
2010
14 years 19 days ago
2010
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent�...
IJCAI
2007
14 years 18 days ago
2007
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize a convex combination of their own proļ¬t and their competitorsā...
AAAI
2012
12 years 1 months ago
2012
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
FOCS
2002
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
2002
IEEE
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and proļ¬t-max...
IJCAI
2007
14 years 18 days ago
2007
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auc...