189 search results - page 18 / 38 » Auctioning Substitutable Goods |
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2002
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
IJCAI
2001
13 years 9 months ago
2001
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
AAIM
2009
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2009
Springer
: © Efficiently Generating k-Best Solutions to Procurement Auctions Andrew Byde, Terence Kelly, Yunhong Zhou, Robert Tarjan HP Laboratories HPL-2009-163 procurement, auctions, dec...
KESAMSTA
2009
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2009
Springer
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic model to study the interaction of bidder and seller agents in sequential automated auctions. We consider a designated “special bidder”...
JCSS
2008
13 years 8 months ago
2008
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...