We investigate equilibrium strategies for bidding agents that participate in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. For this setting, previous rese...
Enrico H. Gerding, Zinovi Rabinovich, Andrew Byde,...
We show that linear logic can serve as an expressive framework in which to model a rich variety of combinatorial auction mechanisms. Due to its resource-sensitive nature, linear l...
We extend the framework of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions to include time constraints, present an expressive bidding language, and show how to solve the winner determinati...
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commer...
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high ...